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DISMISSAL OF PERMANENT TEACHER FOR PUBLIC CRITICISM
OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
Whether a permanent teacher can be dismissed by a local school board
for publicly criticizing the school system was the questiofi in a recent California case,' which engendered statewide debate of a highly emotional
character.2 The purpose of this note is to investigate the permanent teacher's
right to engage in such criticism without losing his position by dismissal, by
examining two important cases. Since teachers no longer serve at the will of
the school board, 3 a brief examination of the teachers' tenure system is
advisable.
Teachers' tenure statutes, by which teachers are granted certain protections from dismissal without cause, have been enacted in most states.4 These
acts generally provide for the orderly dismissal of those teachers who are
professionally incompetent or whose conduct is detrimental to the best interests of the schools and pupils served.- One obvious purpose of such acts is
to protect from dismissal for unjust and arbitrary reasons those teachers who
have completed their probationary period." In 1881 California became one
of the first states to provide statutory protection by amending section 1793
of the Political Code to forbid removal of a teacher elected to her position
7

by the school board except for specified causes.

Teachers' tenure in California, as provided for in the Education Code,
can be traced to the Teachers' Tenure Act8 of 1921. Under this act as it
appears today, a permanent teacher can be dismissed only for one of the
causes specified in section 13403 of the Education Code.9 In California it
I Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962).
2 San Francisco Chronicle, July 27, 1962, p. 17, col. 1.
3 47 Am. Jxm. Schools § 125 (1943).
4 See Annots., 127 A.L.R. 1298 (1940), 113 A.L.R. 1495 (1938), 110 A.L.R. 791

(1937), for construction and validity of teachers' tenure statutes generally. See also
Annot., 147 A.L.R. 293 (1943), for discussion of the effect of repeal or modification of
teachers' tenure statutes.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403, note 9 infra.
6 Fresno City High School Dist. v. DeCaristo, 33 Cal. App. 2d 666, 674, 92 P.2d
5 Cf.

668, 672 (1939). Under CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13320, the probationary period in California is three complete consecutive school years.
7
Cal. Stat. 1881, ch. XLV § 1793, p. 46-47. See Kennedy v. Board of Educ., 82
Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042 (1890) (leading case interpreting this statute).
8 Cal. Stat. 1921, ch. 878, p. 1663. See Comment, 24 CAi. L. RIv. 441 (1936),
for discussion of teachers' tenure in California.
9 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403: "No permanent employee shall be dismissed except
for one or more of the following causes: (a) Immoral or unprofessional conduct. (b)
Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism ....
(c) Dishonesty. (d) Incompetency. (e) Evident unfitness for service. (f) Physical
or mental condition unfitting him to instruct or associate with children. (g) Persistent
violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the State or reasonable regulations
prescribed for the government of the public schools by State Board of Education or by
the governing board of the school board of the school district employing him. (h) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude. (i) Violation of section
8455 [advocating or teaching of communism] of this code or conduct specified in section
1028 [advocating overthrow of the government] of the Government Code . .

.
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has been held that public criticism of the school system as well as other
objectionable conduct is not cause for dismissal unless it falls within one
of the grounds enumerated in section 13403.10
A recent case applying this section was Board of Trustees v. Owens,"3
which for the first time dealt squarely with dismissal of a teacher for public
criticism of the school system. The district court of appeal reversed a superior court finding that Owens' public criticism of school administrators was
unprofessional conduct, a ground for dismissal under section 13403. Owens,
a tenure teacher, had written a number of letters to the local newspaper in
which he proposed public debates on the local educational system. In five
of these letters, 12 Owens was highly critical of school administrators and of
the manner in which they were running the schools.
Charges of unprofessional conduct, evident unfitness for service, and
dishonesty under section 13403 were brought by the board of trustees of
the local school district on the basis of the five letters." The superior court
considered only the unprofessional conduct charge in arriving at the conclusion that Owens' criticism was "unwarranted," "unfounded," and "unsupported by the evidence"; 1 4 this was held to be sufficient grounds to dismiss for
unprofessional conduct. The district court of appeal reversed, holding that
the superior court had misdirected its inquiry. Instead of attempting to
establish that Owens' statements were "unwarranted," "unfounded," and "unsupported by the evidence," the board of trustees should have directed its
inquiry to whether there "had been any disruption or impairment of discipline or the teaching process as a result of defendant's letters.""5 The district
court concluded that the facts in the record would not support a finding of
these elements, which were held to be necessary for dismissal under unprofessional conduct. The court implied that a contrary result might have been
reached if the school board had attempted to convince the trier of fact that
Owens' conduct resulted in a disruption or impairment, rather than pressing
its mistaken effort to vindicate itself by arguing that the schools had been
functioning properly.'
In developing this disruption or impairment test,'7 the court in Owens
Violation of any provision in section 12952 to 12958, inclusive, of this code. [Subversive
activity.] (k) Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist Party."
10Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962);
see generally 44 CAL. Jum. 2d Schools §§ 507-08 (1958).
"1206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962).
:2 Id. at 152-57, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 713-16. The five letters which formed the basis
of the charges are printed in the footnotes to the opinion.
"L3When a hearing is demanded by the teacher, CA.. EDUC. CODE § 13412 requires
the school board to either file a complaint in the superior court to inquire into the
charges or to rescind its action. See George, Dismissal of Permanent Teachers, 3 SANTA
CrAn LAw. 164 (1963), for a brief discussion of the dismissal procedure.
14206
Cal. App. 2d at 149, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
IS Id. at 157, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 717 (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 157-58, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
'7 See Goldsmith v. Board of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 225 Pac. 783 (1924), where
the district court of appeal held that a school board could dismiss for unprofessional
conduct a teacher who advocated to her class a particular candidate for a school district
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relied on Board of Educ. v. Swan18 where the California Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court judgment sustaining a teacher's dismissal for persistent violation of school rules, evident unfitness for service, and unprofessional conduct. Although Swan had been extremely critical of the school
administration in public, there were sufficient grounds for dismissal aside
from public criticism. The value of Swan to the present discussion is found
in two contentions made by Swan as part of her defense.
Swan's first contention was that her dismissal was motivated by personal
bitterness engendered by her public attack on the school board. The court
replied that motive was irrelevant if the school board had a legal right to
dismiss under one or the grounds in section 13403.19 By violating numerous
school rules, Swan had subjected herself to dismissal under that section regardless of improper motive of the school board. Thus even where public
criticism is not sufficient for dismissal, it may act as a motivation to punish
for misconduct that might otherwise be ignored or treated leniently.
Swans second contention was that her dismissal infringed upon her constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, 2 0 including the right to criticize
her superiors without pain of losing her position. In answering this contention, the court stated that one in public service is "subject to reasonable
supervision and restriction . . . to the end that proper discipline may be
maintained, and that activities among the employees may not be allowed
to disrupt or impair the public service."21 By this language the court seems
to sanction dismissal by a school board of an unruly teacher prior to occurrence of anticipated disruption or impairment. Indeed, any other interpretation would be patently unreasonable; a school board cannot carry out its
duty to maintain the proper functioning of the school system if it cannot act
to prevent threatened harm before it occurs.
The application in Owens of the disruption or impairment test of Swan
is remarkable in two respects. First, the test was there employed to define
"unprofessional conduct," rather than to define the limit beyond which criticism loses the protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. Second, the inference from Owens is that a school board cannot dismiss a teacher to prevent anticipated harm, but must refrain from acting
until disruption or impairment in the schools has occurred.2 2 Stripped to its
essentials, the holding was that Owens' public criticism did not constitute
office. The court reasoned that such conduct would lead to a disruption of the school

process since it tended to stir up strife among the students.
1841 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937.
10 Accord, Neuwald v. Brock, 12 Cal. 2d 662, 675-76, 86 P.2d 1047, 1053 (1939);
Kennedy v. State Personnel Board, 6 Cal. 2d 340, 344, 57 P.2d 486, 488 (1936); Monahan v. Department of Water and Power, 48 Cal. App. 2d 746, 754, 120 P.2d 730, 734

(1941).

§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Cal. 2d at 556, 261 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added). See also Pranger v. Break,
186 Cal. App. 2d 551, 556, 9 Cal. Rptr. 293, 297 (1960); City of Los Angeles v. Los
20

U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV,

2141

Angeles Bldg. &Const. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 48-49, 210 P.2d 305, 312-13
(1949); Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 569, 92 P.2d 416, 419-20
(1939).
22 See Goldsmith v. Board of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 225 Pac. 783 (1924); Adams
v. State ex rel. Sutton, 69 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954).
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unprofessional conduct because there had been no disruption or impairment
of the school system. The misapplication of the Swan test does not, however, lead necessarily to the conclusion that the school board was justified
in dismissing Owens; it does lead to the conclusion that the courts are in
23
need of guidance in handling the problems that arise in this sensitive area.
The significance of Owens does not lie in the abortive application of the
"disruption or impairment" test, but in the fact that the teacher was allowed
to obtain protection in the courts against dismissal for public criticism of
the school system.24 It is highly desirable that the public have the benefit
of the views of its teachers in the vital area of education. Because of their
first-hand knowledge of school practices, teachers are in a far better position
than other members of society to offer responsible criticism of school administration. Were teachers unable to obtain the protection of the courts against
retaliatory dismissal by those criticized, the public would be deprived of the
benefit of their invaluable views.
James D. Mart*
23As a result of the Owens decision a bill was introduced in the California legislature in 1963, which proposed that "unprofessional conduct" as a ground for dismissal
be deleted from 13403 of the Education Code. The bill was referred to the Assembly
Education Subcommittee on Personnel which is currently investigating the problem, but
has not as yet submitted its report. Assembly Bill 1235, FNA.L CALENDER OF LEGIsLArve Busmss 429 (1963). One reason for this proposed legislation is that unprofessional conduct offers no clear standard on which teachers may base future action. San
Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 13, 1963, p. 42, col. 1. It is doubtful that the proposed legislation would be a solution. Since section 13403 was enacted, there have been nine

changes in its provisions by amendment. See Whsr's ArgoT. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403

and accompanying historical note. The proposed legislation would seem to be another
piecemeal attempt to afford a temporary remedy. Such piecemeal legislation more often
leads to confusion rather than clarification.

24Aside from the cases, unofficial support for the proposition that teachers are privileged to publicly criticize the school system can be found in the National Code of Ethics
drafted by the National Education Association, and recently adopted by the California
Teachers Association. The Code states, with respect to connitment to the profession:
"In filling our obligations to the profession, we ....
Maintain our integrity when dissenting by basing our public criticism of education on valid assumptions as established
by careful evaluation of facts or hypotheses." CTA Action, Dec. 13, 1963, p. 6 col. 3.
*Member, Second Year Class.

